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The idea of a political European Commission may be the defining idea of the
Juncker Presidency. It was the idea that gave Mr. Juncker the Presidency in
the first place. His candidacy followed several months of campaigning as the
Spitzenkandidat of the European People’s Party. Upon assuming office, Mr. Juncker
justified and promoted his term as Commission President in political terms. He
wanted, as he stated in his 2015 ‘State of the Union’, to ‘lead a political Commission.
A very political Commission.’
Challenges and Opportunities
The political Commission involved a series of trade-offs (some of which were
discussed at the time on the pages of Verfassungsblog, see here and here). A
political Commission could compromise, for example, the Commission’s independent
regulatory role in enforcing EU law or mediating between the interests of Member
States. A Commission with a clearer ideological slant could become the victim of the
forces of ordinary politics, alienating those opposed to its priorities.
There is plenty of evidence of this risk coming to pass. The politicization of the
Commission’s role has made it much easier for opponents of EU policies to cast
the Commission as a partisan actor. When investigating violations of the rule of law
in Poland, the Commission was therefore portrayed as conducting a ‘biased’ and
‘politically motivated’ investigation. By choosing to be ‘political’, the Commission has
associated itself with politics at a time when that profession has its lowest ever level
of public esteem.
There has always, however, been a more compelling case for the political
Commission too. This is not of course the first political European Commission
but simply the first one to be open about, or even embrace, its political role. If the
Commission is more of an ‘ordinary’ political actor, it can also be evaluated like
one. One of the core features of a democracy is its ability to allow voters to ‘throw
the rascals out’ i.e. to hold decision-makers accountable for their decisions, and if
so desired, remove them. As Joseph Weiler has remarked, this is the key test that
Europe has failed. The political Commission re-opened this possibility. It provided
- 1 -
one step by which the EU could transition from a technocratic to a democratic
project.
This transition depends on one crucial ingredient. Political accountability rests on the
ability of voters to render judgment on the policies their leaders have pursued. This
requires a level of information, scrutiny and debate that is plentiful at the national
level but often scarce at the EU one. It requires going back to the promises the
Juncker Commission made at the beginning of its term and investigating whether
they have been delivered (and if not, why not). It requires considering whether
the Commission has responded well to new policy developments, whether it has
shown political leadership and whether it got the most important legal and political
calls right or wrong. It finally requires examining the mechanisms by which policy
was delivered, such as the renewed political structure of the Commission (e.g. its
establishment of a ‘First’ Vice President, and the role of its Secretariat General). The
purpose of this symposium is to ask and answer these questions – did the political
Commission work?
Measuring Success
What are the standards that we should apply when answering that question?
Inevitably, evaluating the Commission often leads to personal comparisons to great
Commissions of the past. In this game, the Delors era weighs heavily. That was a
landmark era, so the folklore goes, because of the leadership role the Commission
played in this period.
Today’s Commission has some advantages over Mnsr. Delors. It carries an
impressive army of officials and agencies, and a range of horizontal competences,
that would be the envy of the Commission of that era. With those great powers,
however, has come constraint. Today’s Commission faces endless negotiation
and scrutiny in advancing its policy agenda. The era where the Commission could
engage in elaborate experiments, confident that national publics would mostly ignore
the catastrophes and be thankful for the successes is long gone. It has made way
for an age where all of the EU’s activities take place in the public glare. National
politics has entered EU politics, and with it, national-led institutions (in particular
the European Council) have increasingly sought to constrain the Commission’s
action, placing themselves as agenda setters. This is the great irony of the political
Commission – it has taken on the freedom to select, prioritise and steer its agenda at
precisely the moment where the Member States must limit its ability to do so.
When highly salient political questions are at play, a Commission that leads from the
front – or that over-reaches its Member States – is thus liable to be humiliated. The
Juncker Commission in this sense seemed to learn the lesson of first year EU policy
process courses: the Commission should aim its proposals at the state on the edge
of a qualified majority vote (no more and no less). Over-reach (as in ambitious early
- 2 -
efforts in areas like refugee re-settlement and social policy) has often been replaced
by what Germans have coined to merkeln (to wait and see and, if in doubt, to go with
the majority view). When evaluating the political Commission we therefore need to
keep the political landscape in mind. It is simply less friendly to free and decisive
institutional leadership than in the past.
The second important point here concerns not the level but the type of standard to
be applied. Understandably, a political Commission is likely to be evaluated using
political lenses. Those academics and policy-makers of a more social-democratic
bent have frequently therefore bemoaned the lack of progress on ‘Social Europe’
during the Juncker Presidency. At the same time, human rights groups have
expressed their concerns at the creeping progress of a security and border control
agenda that could restrict the use of European law to embed European states in
an international legal (and rights based) order. These are all of course legitimate
complaints.
Evaluating a political Commission also, however, implies accepting that such
a Commission can no longer be all things to all men. It can no longer engage
in the traditional exercise of pretending that all of the EU’s policy goals are
reconcilable and mutually supportive (with each policy choice necessarily promoting
competitiveness and equality and social cohesion and human rights and innovation
and so on). The political Commission is precisely about breaking this loop: about
recognising that governing contested areas of policy requires making choices,
and elevating certain goals over others. If we are to hold the political Commission
accountable, we also have to hold that Commission accountable to its own
standards. We have to measure it by the priorities and agenda that it has set for
itself, not just the ones that we (from whatever viewpoint) would desire of the EU
as an organization ‘acting in the European interest’ (as if that carried one neutral
definition). Evaluating the political Commission in this sense requires new criteria.
Measuring Juncker’s Success
How should these criteria be applied to the Commission and to the Juncker
Presidency in particular? Again, it is worth distinguishing here between the two
aspects above: the first focusing on leadership, and the extent to which the
Commission could build an independent ‘European’ agenda, distinct from that of the
most powerful states; the second focusing on policy, and whether this Commission
delivered on its promises.
Handling the big things
The first, leadership set of criteria inevitably engages with the style and personality
of the President himself. Few would depict this as a high-profile Presidency. Many
of the moments where the EU has reached the public eye, such as confrontation
with the US administration, machinations over Brexit or spats with individual Member
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States, have concerned other individuals, such as the European Council President
or Mr. Juncker’s chief advisor (and now Secretary General) Martyn Selmayr. Mr.
Juncker has chosen (and in respect of failing health, sometimes been forced)
to adopt a more hands-off and relaxed style than some of his predecessors,
playing down political conflict. This included far higher levels of delegation, with the
establishment both of a ‘First’ Vice President and a list of other VPs, responsible for
groupings of policy portfolios (and often associated with those policies in the media
eye).
The pace of political life has thus altered. A good example is the volume of
legislative proposals. While the second Barroso Commission (according to Eur-
Lex) averaged just over 100 legislative proposals adopted per year, the period
from 2015-2018 carries so far an average of just over 60 adopted acts per year.
To this extent, the Juncker Commission has done what it promised. This was to
be a Commission ‘doing more on the big things and less on the small things’. It
pledged, through its ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, to focus as much on the removal
and consolidation of existing proposals, as on the establishment of new ones.
The question may be less whether the ‘small things’ were avoided than whether the
‘big things’ were really implemented. On this front, the Juncker Commission was
not short of ideas. To take the example of the ‘completion’ of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), in its ‘December package’ of last year, the Commission
advanced a number of proposals, from the establishment of a European Monetary
Fund, to a banking backstop, a Eurozone finance ministry and a stabilization fund for
the currency area. In refugee policy, a central goal was the plan, announced in 2015,
to relocate Italian and Greek based refugees across the territory of the Union. Both
were, in theory, solidarity enhancing projects; designed to allow the greater sharing
of risk and common burdens across the European area.
In truth, both the intellectual impetus for these measures, and the means to
implement them, rested elsewhere. The relocation and EMU plans took their lead
from ideas developed in Berlin and Paris respectively, as well as a number of
academic proposals. The lack of progress on both sets of initiatives illustrates well
the inability of the Commission to move forward in sensitive policy areas without the
support of the Member States (in the EMU case because of German reluctance; in
the refugee example because of the simple refusal of Central and Eastern European
states to implement an agreement on which they had been outvoted in the Council)
Where results have been found, they have therefore often been cast outside the
institutions and framework of the Union. The infamous ‘Turkey deal’ on asylum flows
thus took the form of an inter-governmental agreement. Similarly the Commission’s
efforts to integrate the fiscal compact within the legal structure of the EU, or
institutionalise the ESM through an EU IMF, have floundered following national
skepticism. As a result, this Commission has been less than successful in defending
the core of Delors’ legacy – the ‘Community method’. By embracing new modes of
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‘Better Regulation’ and soft law processes such as the European Semester, it may
even have significantly eroded the anchoring of the EU project in ‘normal’ EU law.
Beaten Paths and New Adventures
What about the second, policy-related set of criteria? This requires going back to
2014 and the ‘political guidelines’ set-out by Juncker in the summer of that year.
Looking back, this is a rather ambitious (if not very detailed) document. At its heart
were ten flagship projects: around half of which concerned ‘deepening’ or altering
existing projects (in EMU, the internal market, the Energy Union, Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) and international development); and half of which concerned newer
policy challenges (e.g. the ‘digital’ single market, establishing joint asylum and
border policies, and establishing a free trade agreement with the US).
It is perhaps unsurprising that the projects involving ‘deepening’ or re-balancing
existing EU policies seemed to fare much better than newer adventures. An obvious
obstacle is the tendency for well-laid plans to be side-lined by ongoing events. To
take the example of the US trade agreement, a plan that had already been severely
weakened after extensive resistance and protest in several Member States in 2015
was seemingly killed-off for good by the election of a US President openly sceptical
of trade agreements in general and the EU-US agreement in particular.
A further, and more concerning, danger, is that ‘new’ projects require capacities that
far outstrip the EU’s existing institutional structure. First among these is the issue
of migration and asylum. While the 2014 guidelines included language on border
security, its main focus was on harmonising asylum procedures and establishing
new policies on legal migration. This approach – essentially tinkering with national
rules – was well within the EU’s traditional toolkit. This has to be contrasted with the
scale of policy challenges in this field faced almost continuously since 2014. Facing
such a challenge – the entry of millions of individuals into the Union and the diverse
needs they bring – requires more than the EU’s regular recipe of creating common
standards. Such a task requires extensive state capacity in fields like integration and
border control that quickly overwhelmed the EU’s administration and agencies.
By contrast, in areas discussed in the 2014 guidelines where the EU’s existing
competences are clearer, e.g. digitalization, energy or the JHA, progress in adopting
significant legislation (such as the enormous General Data Protection Regulation,
GDPR) has been far more rapid. In this sense, we have a Commission whose ability
to adapt to new challenges varies enormously across policy fields.
Many of the changes instituted by the Juncker Presidency in more contested areas
of policy have thus been changes to tone and institutional direction rather than grand
legislative plans.
A case in point is one of the ‘flagship’ projects of a vaguer and more cross-cutting
character – the attempt to establish a ‘fairer’ EMU. As part of this, the Commission
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promised to conduct social impact assessment on conditionality plans for bail-
out states, and to change the direction of the European Semester, allowing for
more fiscally and socially balanced recommendations. In the former case, the main
result was an IA on the third Greek bail-out, where the Commission argued (with
a straight face) that extensive cuts in social provision would provide stable fiscal
conditions in the long-term and therefore would have socially beneficial effects. In
the latter case, there is some evidence that the Juncker Presidency has modestly
altered the direction of EU fiscal policy, both providing more flexibility to the Member
States and improving the scope and number of ‘socially oriented’ country-specific
recommendations. If the Juncker Presidency has wielded power, it has thus often
wielded it in different ways: less focus on innovative big-ticket items and more on
everyday interaction and negotiation with national governments.
In this sense, the Juncker Presidency did not turn out so differently from what we
expected. We expected a President attune to the weapons of soft power, competent
in negotiating, and favouring the slow build-up of national consensus over free-
wheeling or impulsive leadership. That is exactly what we got. What we did not get
was the more optimistic rendering of the political Commission – a policy innovator,
re-defining the Commission’s role and wresting control of integration from the
Member States. Such a Commission may be near impossible in the early 21st
Century: it certainly was ill-suited to the talents of this particular Presidency.
Calling a Spade a Spade
What then is the future of the political Commission? It would be tempting, given the
above, to give up on the idea. If the political Commission yielded a Commission
more adept at day to day management than big ideas, and often driven by the
agendas of the largest Member States, what was the point in the exercise at
all? This may be part of the explanation for the luke-warm reception among
national leaders, of continuing the Spitzenkandidaten experiment next year. This is
epitomized by the attitude of Emmanuel Macron – if such a Europhile leader cannot
be drawn to the idea, who can?
It may be too early, however, to abandon the political Commission. The truth, to
use another German term coined in EU politics, is that the political Commission is
alternativlos. Those opposed to the idea must answer a simple question: what is the
objective, regulatory, de-politicised set of policies the EU must advance for which the
Commission can be a neutral arbiter? The irony of the last decade, and the Juncker
Presidency, is that it is the era where previously consensus-based areas of policy,
with near unanimous national support (free movement, the need for a common
currency, ‘basic’ rule of law standards, free trade, ‘undistorted’ competition), have
become the most contested set of questions of all. We live in an age (one we might
well mourn) where things thought to be un-political, or part of a base-line societal
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consensus, are no longer so. This extends to the EU Treaties themselves, and the
very idea of free trans-national movement and cooperation.
Integration involves choice; it involves defending a distinct policy agenda in the face
of ‘legitimate opposition’ in a far greater sense than ever before. Mr. Juncker may
not have been the best of all defenders of a political Commission, but the need for
such a Commission is likely to outlive his Presidency.
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